Transfer Learning Between U.S. Presidential Elections

Xinran Miao, Jiwei Zhao, Hyunseung Kang

Department of Statistics University of Wisconsin - Madison

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None of us are experts in U.S. elections.

But, 2020 and 2024 U.S. presidential elections present a **very unique** opportunity to study transportability/generalizability in U.S. elections.

Comments/Critiques are highly appreciated!

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- ▶ Analysis tool: linear regression.

Example Political Ads in Treatment Group

Ads were on Facebook, Instagram, and Outbrain advertising network.

Four Is Enough ponsored - Paid for by PACRONYM

Boost the News Sponsored · Paid for by ACRONYM

A Trump nominee could allow a conservative court to use its majority to overturn Roe vs. Wade, which quarantees a woman's right to abortion, and strike down Obamacare and its promise of health insurance for millions, including those with preexisting conditions.

MSN COM

News Analysis: RBG's successor could push the Supreme Court to end abortion rights and Obamacare

Democrats could win the election and lose the Supreme Court for a generation

This 2016 Trump voter won't vote for him again after Trump's poor handling of coronavirus put her family's lives at risk.

WWW.TRUMPCORONAVIRUSPLAN.COM Carole voted for Trump in 2016. She won't be voting for him in 2020.

Learn more

(a): ads promoting news stories (b): traditional video campaign ads

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- ▶ Negative effect: ad against Trump decreased voter turnout.
	- For example, a Trump supporter may choose not to vote after seeing ads against Trump.
- ▶ Positive effect: ad against Trump increased voter turnout.
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A quote that grabbed our attention and motivated this work: *"One reasonable question for our study is how well our findings would generalize...to other electoral contexts....it could be that the 2020 election was exceptional because of COVID and the idiosyncrasies of the candidates, so perhaps digital advertising would have larger effects in more typical settings.*..."

Key Question: Would the Negative Ad Against Trump Remain Ineffective in 2024?

2024 election provides a **unique** opportunity to study this question. Some similarities between 2020 and 2024:

- ▶ Same presumptive candidates from major political parties (Biden, Trump)¹. Both candidates are seeking a second term².
- ▶ Nearly similar treatment/ad campaigns (i.e. ad against Trump).
- Recent polls suggest economy is still a major concern for voters.

¹Last time this occurred was in 1956.

 2 Last time this occurred was in 1892.

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- ▶ Nearly similar treatment/ad campaigns (i.e. ad against Trump).
- ▶ Recent polls suggest economy is still a major concern for voters. Some notable differences:
	- ▶ 2020: COVID-19, death of George Floyd and racial unrest, etc.
	- ▶ 2024: abortion, immigration, Ukraine/Israel, etc.

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Our Contribution: Application-Driven Setup & Methods

"Design" elements:

- **Allows for covariate shift.**
- Does not assume same covariates between 2020 and 2024.
- Does not assume the transportability.

pr(voted if given ad | 2024 (i.e. **target**)*,* voter demographics) \neq pr(voted if given ad | 2020 (i.e. **source**), voter demographics)

▶ "Analysis" elements:

- Simple, design-inspired estimator.
- One (theoretically) correct approach to bootstrapping in transfer learning.
- **Efficient influence function based estimator.**
- "Demystifying" sensitivity analysis with source data calibration.
- ▶ Notations and review
- ▶ Setup: Transfer learning with sensitivity analysis
- ▶ Estimators of the target ATE
- ▶ Preliminary data analysis on Pennsylvania

Notation and Causal Assumptions

- ▶ Population type: $S \in \{0, 1\}$ where $S = 1$ is source (e.g. 2020) and $S = 0$ is target (e.g. 2024).
- ▶ Outcome: $Y \in \{0, 1\}$ where $Y = 1$ is voted.
- ▶ Treatment: $A \in \{0, 1\}$ where $A = 1$ is ad against Trump.
- ▶ Covariates: **X** where
	- Source covariates: **X**,
	- Target covariates: **V** ⊂ **X**.
- ▶ Potential outcomes: $Y(a) \in \{0, 1\}, a \in \{0, 1\}.$
	- \blacksquare *Y*(1): voted if, contrary to fact, voter got negative ad.
	- \blacksquare *Y*(0): voted if, contrary to fact, voter did not get negative ad.

Data Table for Our Setup

The goal is to identify and estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) on the target,

$$
\theta = \mathbb{E}[Y(1) - Y(0) | S = 0].
$$

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	- The propensity score $\pi(\mathbf{x})$ is known in an RCT.

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- It is often assumed, but cannot be verified.
- We assume it for now, but will relax it shortly!

Review: Identification Under (A1)-(A5)

Let $\mu_a(\mathbf{X}) = \mathbb{E}[Y | \mathbf{X}, A = a, S = 1]$. Under (A1)-(A5), the target ATE is identified:

$$
\theta = \mathbb{E}[Y(1) - Y(0) | S = 0]
$$

= $\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\mu_1(\mathbf{X}) - \mu_0(\mathbf{X}) | \mathbf{V}, S = 1] | S = 0].$
ATE(**X**) in source
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Reweigh ATE(**V**) to target

For reference, when $X = V$, we have

$$
\theta = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\mu_1(\mathbf{X}) - \mu_0(\mathbf{X}) \mid S = 0].
$$
Suppose transportability (A5) does not hold:

$$
\underbrace{\text{pr}(Y(1), Y(0) \mid \mathbf{V}, S=0)}_{\text{unobserved target (2024)}} \neq \underbrace{\text{pr}(Y(1), Y(0) \mid \mathbf{V}, S=1)}_{\text{observed source (2020)}}, \text{ then}
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\underbrace{\text{Odd}(Y(a)|\mathbf{V}, S=0)}_{\text{mod }Y, S=0}) := \frac{\Pr(Y(a) = 1 \mid \mathbf{V}, S=0)}{1 - \Pr(Y(a) = 1 \mid \mathbf{V}, S=1)} = \frac{\Pr(Y(a) = 1 \mid \mathbf{V}, S=1)}{1 - \Pr(Y(a) = 1 \mid \mathbf{V}, S=1)} := \text{Odd}(Y(a)|\mathbf{V}, S=1).
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$$

For each $Y(a)$, we measure the deviation between the unobserved target the source counterpart via odds ratios (see formulation for a continuous outcome in [Appendix\)](#page-88-0):

$$
\exp(\gamma_a) = \frac{\text{Odd}(Y(a) \mid \mathbf{v}, S=0)}{\text{Odd}(Y(a) \mid \mathbf{v}, S=1)}, \ \gamma_a \in (-\infty, \infty). \tag{1}
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▶ When $\gamma_a = 0$, $\exp(\gamma_a) = \exp(0) = 1 = \frac{\text{Odd}(Y(a) \mid \mathbf{v}, S = 0)}{\text{Odd}(Y(a) \mid \mathbf{v}, S = 1)} \implies (A5)$ holds.

► When $γ_a ≠ 0$, (A5) does not hold; $γ_a$ measures the degree of violation to (A5).

Sensitivity model: $\exp(\gamma_a) = \text{Odd}(Y(a) | \mathbf{v}, S = 0) / \text{Odd}(Y(a) | \mathbf{v}, S = 1).$

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- **▶ When** $\gamma_a \neq 0$, larger $|\gamma_a|$ ⇒ larger differences between 2024 and 2020.
- **▶ Positive** γ_1 \Rightarrow more turnout in 2024 after receiving ads against Trump compared to that in 2020.

Toy example: $pr(Y(a) = 1 | V, S = 1) = expit(-0.1V)$.

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- **▶ When** $\gamma_a \neq 0$, larger $|\gamma_a|$ ⇒ larger differences between 2024 and 2020.
- **▶ Positive** γ_1 \Rightarrow more turnout in 2024 after receiving ads against Trump compared to that in 2020.
- **▶ Negative** γ_1 \Rightarrow less turnout in 2024 after receiving ads against Trump compared to that in 2020.

Identification Under $(A1)-(A4) +$ Sensitivity Model

Recall $\mu_a(\mathbf{X}) = \mathbb{E}(Y | \mathbf{X}, A = a, S = 1)$. Under (A1)-(A4) and the sensitivity model,

$$
\mathbb{E}[Y(a) | S = 0] = \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\mathbb{E}\{\exp(\gamma_a)\mu_a(\mathbf{X}) | \mathbf{V}, S = 1\}}{\mathbb{E}\{\exp(\gamma_a)\mu_a(\mathbf{X}) + 1 - \mu_a(\mathbf{X}) | \mathbf{V}, S = 1\}}\bigg|S = 0\right]
$$

▶ When $\gamma_a = 0$, transportability (A5) holds, we return to the previous result: $\mathbb{E}[Y(a) | S = 0] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[\mu_a(\mathbf{X}) | \mathbf{V}, S = 1] | S = 0].$

▶ When $\gamma_a \neq 0$, it is an exponential tilt of $\rho_a(\mathbf{V}) = \mathbb{E}[\mu_a(\mathbf{X}) | \mathbf{V}, S = 1].$

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(2) Average the exponentially tilted $\hat{\rho}_a(\mathbf{V})$ among target sample,

$$
\widehat{\mathbb{E}}[Y(a) | S = 0] = \frac{1}{n_t} \sum_{i \in \text{Target}} \frac{\exp(\gamma_a) \widehat{\rho}_a(\mathbf{v}_i)}{\exp(\gamma_a) \widehat{\rho}_a(\mathbf{v}_i) + 1 - \widehat{\rho}_a(\mathbf{v}_i)},
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- \triangleright Constructing a 1 − *α* CI of θ (see [Appendix](#page-89-0) for details).
	- At each iteration *b*, bootstrap the source data and target data separately, construct an estimator $\hat{\theta}_b^*$ with resampled data.

• After *B* iterations, take
$$
\alpha/2
$$
 and $1 - \alpha/2$ quantiles of $\left\{\widehat{\theta}_b^*\right\}_{b=1}^B$.

Estimator Based on Efficient Influence Function

For a given γ_a , we have the efficient influence function (EIF) of θ .

- \blacktriangleright The EIF is **very messy** because (a) $V \neq X$ and (b) sensitivity analysis; see [Appendix.](#page-92-0)
- \triangleright Our EIF recovers [\[Zeng et al., 2023\]](#page-84-0)'s EIF when $\gamma_a = 0$.

Practically, an EIF-based estimator is useful if **V** is continuous.

- **E** Four nuisance functions: (i) propensity score $\pi(\mathbf{X})$, (ii) outcome regression $\mu_a(\mathbf{X})$, (iii) projection of outcome regression $\rho(\mathbf{V})$, and (iv) weights between source and target $w(\mathbf{V}) = p(\mathbf{V} | S = 0) / p(\mathbf{V} | S = 1).$
- ▶ To avoid Donsker conditions, we need cross-fitting in source data.
- **►** The estimator is not doubly robust for $\gamma_a \neq 0$.
- Also, the estimator does not reduce "plug-in bias" from $\rho_a(\mathbf{V})$.

Target Data: Registered Voters in Pennsylvania (PA)

- \triangleright 4,880,730 registered voters (as of Apr. 15, 2024) from 67 counties.
- ▶ **V**: age group, gender, party, an incomplete voting history.
	- **X** \vee : race, missing voting history.
- ▶ We look at each county in Pennsylvania
	- n_t ranges from 1,117 to 685,620; median is 25,182.
- ▶ For sensitivity parameters, we use $-0.05 \leq \gamma_a \leq 0.05$ $(0.951 \leq \exp(\gamma_a) \leq 1.051)$.
- For inference, we use the simple plug-in estimator with bootstrap.

Example of Sensitivity Contours

- **►** When $\gamma_1 = \gamma_0 = 0$ (transportability (A5) holds; 2024 ≈ 2020), all effects remain insignificant.
- **►** When $\gamma_1\gamma_0 \neq 0$ ((A5) does not hold; 2024 \neq 2020), the effect can be significant under 0.05 level.

The transportability (A5) holds

The Most and Least Sensitive Counties

We calculate the smallest $\exp(|\gamma_1 - \gamma_0|)$ that turns the ATE significant.

- ▶ ^A **lower** value indicates a smaller difference between 2024 and 2020 can make the ad to significantly affect the voter turnout \implies **more sensitive**.
- ▶ A **higher** value indicates only a large difference between 2024 and 2020 can make the ad to significantly affect the voter turnout \implies less sensitive.

	Positive ad effects		Negative ad effects	
	County	$\exp(\gamma_1-\gamma_0)$	County	$\exp(\gamma_1-\gamma_0)$
Most Sensitive	Philadelphia	1.018	Bedford	1.002
	Monroe	1.028	Fulton	1.002
Least Sensitive	Bedford	1.010	Allegheny	1.041
	Fulton	1.105	Philadelphia	1.062
	Clinton		Clinton	

Table 1 . The most and least sensitive counties.

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- (1) Partition source into two "dissimilar" subpopulations (i.e. subpopulations are not similar after adjusting for covariates).
	- For example, in [\[Aggarwal et al., 2023\]](#page-79-1), we created [PA,MI,WI] ("blue" collar states") and [NC,AZ] ("not blue collar states").
- (2) Use one partition as source, the other as target.

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- (3) Let the subset $C \subset \mathbb{R}^2$ be the range of (γ_1, γ_0) pairs where the corresponding transported CI overlaps with the oracle CI.

In sensitivity analysis, there is always a question about what is a "large", "small", or a "plausible" sensitivity parameter *γa*.

We present one solution to this question by creating **dis-similar** partitions of the source data.

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The γ_a 's from PA that overlap with the subset C are "plausible".

Examples of Calibrations

Figure 1: The smallest $\exp(\gamma_1 - \gamma_0)$ turns ATE significant when $\gamma_1 > \gamma_0$.

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³From Ballotpedia

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	- Northampton is a "pivot" county³ (Biden won by 1,233 votes; 172,065 voters voted).

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	- Northampton is a "pivot" county³ (Biden won by 1,233 votes; 172,065 voters voted).
- \blacktriangleright Biden has won all of the nine counties in the 2020 election.
	- **Biden leaners may be encouraged to vote by ads against Trump; this** aligns with analyses in [\[Aggarwal et al., 2023\]](#page-79-1) stratified by Trump supporting score.

³From Ballotpedia

Figure 2: The smallest $\exp(\gamma_0 - \gamma_1)$ inducing significance when $\gamma_0 > \gamma_1$.

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Figure 2: The smallest $\exp(\gamma_0 - \gamma_1)$ inducing significance when $\gamma_0 > \gamma_1$.

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- П Receiving ads against Trump may discourage them to vote.
- The most sensitive counties are Fulton and Bedford; smallest m, $\exp(\gamma_0 - \gamma_1) = 1.002$.

Calibrated Results for Negative Ad Effects

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- Receiving ads against Trump may discourage them to vote.
- The most sensitive counties are Fulton and Bedford; smallest $\exp(\gamma_0 - \gamma_1) = 1.002$.
- \blacksquare They have the largest margin for Trump (85.41% for Trump in Fulton; 83.39% for Trump in Bedford) in 2020 U.S. presidential election.

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- Receiving ads against Trump may discourage them to vote.
- The most sensitive counties are Fulton and Bedford; smallest \blacksquare $\exp(\gamma_0 - \gamma_1) = 1.002$.
- \blacksquare They have the largest margin for Trump (85.41% for Trump in Fulton; 83.39% for Trump in Bedford) in 2020 U.S. presidential election.
- ▶ Three swing counties may have ad effects in either direction: Centre, Lehigh, Northampton.

Some Preliminary Takeaways from PA

- ▶ If transportability (A5) holds (i.e. $2020 \approx 2024$), all counties will have near zero ad effects in 2024.
- \blacktriangleright If (A5) fails, a few counties could have positive ad effects, whereas most could have negative ad effects in 2024.
	- The direction largely depends on their leaning towards Trump/Biden (Republican/Democrat).
	- **Counties with mostly Trump leaners are likely to vote less, whereas** counties with Biden leaners will vote more.
	- The direction can go either way in swing counties.

Summary and Ongoing Work

- ▶ Motivation: From [\[Aggarwal et al., 2023\]](#page-79-0), would the negative ad against Trump in 2020 remain ineffective in 2024?
- ▶ Our approach: transfer learning with sensitivity analysis
	- Setup: (a) source is from RCT, (b) $V \neq X$, (c) data is discrete.
	- Analysis: (a) simple plug-in estimator with bootstrap SE/CIs , (b) EIF-based approach, (c) calibration of sensitivity parameters with source data.
- ▶ Preliminary analysis of Pennsylvania.
- Ongoing work
	- Repeat analysis with other states (WI, NC and GA).
	- Use 2022 U.S. midterm elections to improve $\hat{\theta}$ and to improve calibration.

Acknowledgements

▶ Thank you to Xiaobin Zhou for finding this data :)

▶ Thank you all for coming. Comments are highly appreciated!

▶ Thank you to Steven Moen for finding typos in an earlier version!

Part I

[Appendix](#page-78-0)

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FAQs

▶

- \blacktriangleright Is the calibration reasonable? Great question! We're also experimenting with the "right" way to assess whether a give *γ* value is extreme or not.
- ▶ Why is your voter data all discrete? We're not sure and this surprised us too. Perhaps, this is done to preserve some privacy?
- ▶ Is party registration measured accurately? **Yes and no**. [\[Aggarwal et al., 2023\]](#page-79-0) and current voter registration data documentation discuss some reasons for errors.
- ▶ Is your conclusion sensitive to data quality from 2024 voter registration data (i.e. target data)? **Yes**. Unfortunately, high quality target data is expensive.
- ▶ What about treating this data as longitudinal? Excellent idea, but this requires measuring same voter over time.

Some Prior Works

The closest related literature is transportability/generalizability.

We are definitely not the only ones to incorporate sensitivity analysis in transportability/generalizability. A very small, partial list:

- ▶ Linear, outcome sensitivity model: [\[Nguyen et al., 2017,](#page-82-0) [Dahabreh et al., 2020,](#page-80-0) [Dahabreh et al., 2023,](#page-81-0) [Zeng et al., 2023\]](#page-84-0)
- ▶ Exponential tilting sensitivity model: [\[Dahabreh et al., 2022\]](#page-80-1)
- ▶ Marginal sensitivity model for transfer learning functionals: [\[Nie et al., 2021\]](#page-83-0)
- ▶ Omitted variable bias approach with weighted estimators: [\[Huang, 2024\]](#page-82-1)

Our goal is to tailor these methods to address our key questions.

[Appendix](#page-85-0)

Two-Parameter Sensitivity Model and Some Remarks

To jointly characterize $Y(1)$, $Y(0)$, we use the following model

$$
pr(Y(1) = y_1, Y(0) = y_0 | \mathbf{V} = \mathbf{v}, S = 0)
$$

$$
\propto exp(\gamma_1 y_1 + \gamma_0 y_0) \cdot pr(Y(1) = y_1, Y(0) = y_0 | \mathbf{V} = \mathbf{v}, S = 1)
$$

Some remarks:

- ▶ The sensitivity model does not place any observable restrictions on the observed data [\[Robins et al., 2000,](#page-83-1) [Franks et al., 2019\]](#page-81-1)
- \blacktriangleright A pseudo- R^2 version of γ_a is in Proposition 3 of [\[Franks et al., 2019\]](#page-81-1).
- ▶ The sensitivity model can depend on covariates $(\exp(\gamma_v^T v + ...)$
- ▶ Some works that use this model: [\[Robins et al., 2000,](#page-83-1) [Franks et al., 2019,](#page-81-1) [Scharfstein et al., 2021,](#page-84-1) [Dahabreh et al., 2022\]](#page-80-1)
- ▶ There is a long and healthy debate about what constitutes a "good" sensitivity analysis. $9/14$

Alternative Formulation: Exponential Tilting Model

The selection odds model [\(1\)](#page-36-0) can be equivalently written as

$$
p(y(a) | \mathbf{V}, S = 0) \propto \exp\{\gamma_a y(a)\} \cdot p(y(a) | \mathbf{v}, S = 1).
$$
 (2)

Under (A1)-(A4) and [\(2\)](#page-88-0), we can identify $\mathbb{E}(Y(a) | S = 0)$ as

$$
\mathbb{E}(Y(a) | S = 0) = \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left\{\exp(\gamma_a Y)Y | \mathbf{X}, A = a, S = 1\right\} \mathbf{V}, S = 1\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{E}\left\{\exp(\gamma_a Y) | \mathbf{X}, A = a, S = 1\right\} \mathbf{V}, S = 1\right]} \middle| S = 0 \right).
$$

Bootstrapping for Transfer Learning

We lay out one (theoretically valid) bootstrap for transfer learning with sensitivity analysis.

In each bootstrap iteration $b \in \{1, \dots, B\}$:

(1) Resample source data with replacement of size n_s , obtain data $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{S}}^*$.

(2) Resample target data with replacement of size n_t , obtain data $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}^*$.

(3) With $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{S}}^*$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{T}}^*$, construct the ATE estimator $\widehat{\theta}_b^*$ from above.

Take
$$
\alpha/2
$$
 and $1 - \alpha/2$ quantiles of $\left\{\widehat{\theta}_{b}^*\right\}_{b=1}^B$ as a $1 - \alpha$ CI of θ .

Theorem: If $\rho(\mathbf{V})$ is smooth enough and Donsker condition holds, the above procedure yields a valid $1 - \alpha$ CI of θ .

The smoothness + Donsker conditions hold for our discrete voter data. [\[Return to main slides.](#page-47-0)]

Voter Demographics Between Source and Target Population

Figure 3: Registered voter demographics.

[Appendix](#page-85-0)

Preliminary Result for PA: A Larger **V** Robustifies Conclusions

• (gender, age, party) • (gender, age, party) and voting history

Figure 4: The smallest $\exp(|\gamma_1 - \gamma_0|)$ that makes $\hat{\theta}(\gamma_1, \gamma_0)$ significant. Left considers the case where $\gamma_1 > \gamma_0$ and right considers the case when $\gamma_1 < \gamma_2$ 13 / 14

EIF-Based Estimator

$$
\begin{split}\n\widehat{\theta}_{\text{EIF},a} &= \\
\frac{1}{n_{s}} \sum_{i \in \text{Source}} \widehat{w}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) \left(\left\{ \frac{a_{i}}{\widehat{\pi}(\mathbf{x}_{i})} + \frac{1 - a_{i}}{1 - \widehat{\pi}(\mathbf{x}_{i})} \right\} \left[\frac{e^{\gamma_{a} y_{i}} y_{i}}{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) + 1 - \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_{i})} - \frac{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\mu}_{a}(\mathbf{x}_{i})}{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) + 1 - \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_{i})} \right. \\
&\left. - \frac{e^{\gamma_{a} y_{i}} \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i})}{[e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) + 1 - \rho_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i})]^{2}} + \frac{\{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\mu}_{a}(\mathbf{x}_{i}) + 1 - \widehat{\mu}_{a}(\mathbf{x}_{i})\}e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_{i})}{[e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) + 1 - \rho_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i})]^{2}} \right] \\
&+ \frac{\widehat{\mu}_{a}(\mathbf{x}_{i}) \{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) + 1 - \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_{i})\} - \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) \{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\mu}_{a}(\mathbf{x}_{i}) + 1 - \widehat{\mu}_{a}(\mathbf{x}_{i})\}}{[e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) + 1 - \rho_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i})]^{2}} \right)} \\
&+ \frac{1}{n_{t}} \sum_{i \in \text{Target}} \frac{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i})}{e^{\gamma_{a}} \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i}) + 1 - \widehat{\rho}_{a}(\mathbf{v}_{i})} .\n\end{split}
$$

When $\gamma_a = 0$, it collapses to [\[Zeng et al., 2023\]](#page-84-0):

$$
= \frac{1}{n_s} \sum_{i \in \text{Source}} \widehat{w}(\mathbf{v}_i) \left(\frac{a_i}{\widehat{\pi}(\mathbf{x}_i)} + \frac{1 - a_i}{1 - \widehat{\pi}(\mathbf{x}_i)} \right) [y_i - \widehat{\mu}_a(\mathbf{x}_i)] + \frac{1}{n_s} \sum_{i \in \text{Source}} \widehat{w}(\mathbf{v}_i) [\widehat{\mu}_a(\mathbf{x}_i) - \widehat{\rho}_a(\mathbf{v}_i)] + \frac{1}{n_t} \sum_{i \in \text{Target}} \widehat{\rho}(\mathbf{v}_i).
$$

[\[Return to main slides.](#page-52-0)] $14/14$